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1. Subnational governments as laboratories of experimentation
This article departs from the observation stated in the editorial that climate change gov-
ernance is heavily determined by processes taking place at multiple levels that are mutually 
influencing, a phenomenon referred to as ‘multi-level governance’ (see also Gupta 2007; 
Andonova & Mitchell 2010). One aspect of the multi-level governance of climate change is 
the influence of negotiations within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) on policy-making within the European Union (EU) and its member states, 
including at the subnational and local level. Such top-down dynamics are increasingly paral-
leled by bottom-up processes. Probably the most visible examples of that are the ambitious 
climate strategies of cities worldwide (Bulkeley 2013), which are often challenging less ambi-
tious policies defended at the national level. Scholars of multi-level governance have recently 
been studying the impact of such local ambitions on global climate policy-making, as well 
as the interplay of different efforts across governmental levels and with non-governmental 
actors and dynamics (Jörgensen et al. This volume).
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Somewhat less researched than local governments are the climate policies of subnational 
governments such as regions, provinces or states. But the interest in ‘bottom-up innovation’ 
for climate change at the subnational level is growing, partly spurred by the continued lack 
of progress in global climate governance (Jörgensen et al. This volume). The current research 
interest fits in a tradition of environmental federalism, in which the notion of ‘laboratories 
of experimentation’ has been applied to denote the capacity of subnational governments 
to innovate in the implementation of national and international policies, or in the design of 
their own policies (Jörgensen et al. This volume). The idea, which emerged in the context of 
US federalism, is based on the assumption that subnational governments are well-placed to 
experiment with new policy ideas and instruments that, if successful and diffused to other 
governments, can become drivers for better policies at the national level or even interna-
tionally (Osborne 1988; Volden 1997; rabe 2003; Jörgensen et al. This volume). Especially 
since the 2000s, research into subnational experimentation has been applied to the case of 
climate change. Much of that research aims at identifying ‘leadership’ in climate governance, 
and assessing the drivers and capacities that subnational governments have for bottom-up 
innovation (rabe et al. 2006; Engel & Orbach 2008; Engel 2009; McEwen & Bomberg 2014; 
royles & McEwen 2013; Jörgensen et al. This volume).
This article zooms in on the Belgian case, which so far has not been the object of exten-
sive analysis with regard to climate change and multi-level governance. The Belgian subna-
tional governments, nonetheless, are theoretically well-placed to serve as laboratories of 
experimentation, considering their high policy-making autonomy in many different fields. 
Since previous research has shown that institutional and political factors are crucial drivers 
of climate governance in Belgium (Happaerts et al. 2012), the analysis will depart from the 
institutional architecture of federal Belgium, and the different opportunities and constraints 
it offers for subnational climate policies. This article therefore explores to which extent the 
Belgian subnational governments function as laboratories of experimentation. Three of 
the main characteristics of Belgian federalism – the exclusive division of competences, the 
principle of no hierarchy and the Europeanization of inter-governmental relations – are the 
independent variables whose impact on the subnational governments’ policies are studied. 
The analysis will find that an overall low political ambition for climate policy emerges as an 
intervening variable.
The analysis presented in this article builds upon literature review, previous research and, 
an extensive analysis of policy documents.1 The empirical data was triangulated with inter-
views with three policy officials in Flanders and two in Wallonia, who also gave additional 
insights into the political dynamics of climate governance in Belgium. The research was 
conducted early 2012, but the empirical data of the article was updated mid-2013.
The next section outlines the main characteristics of the federal architecture that defines 
climate policy-making in Belgium. Then, after explaining how climate change efforts are 
divided in the country, the article turns to the analysis of the climate policies of the sub-
national governments. Subsequently, the risks of policy failures of the Belgian system are 
explained, and the article casts a glance at the near future of climate governance in the 
country. The final section lays out the main conclusions.
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2. Belgian federalism: extensive policy-making autonomy for subnational 
governments
This section gives an overview of Belgian federalism and the distribution of competences, 
with the aim of clarifying the role of the subnational level in multi-level climate govern-
ance. It also describes three main characteristics of the Belgian system that are necessary to 
understand Belgian climate politics. Those are the principles of dual federalism on which the 
system is built, the inherent need for cooperation, and the politicized relations. The section 
describes the situation before 2014, when a new state reform was approved, transferring 
more competences to the subnational level.
Belgium officially became a federal state in 1993, through a gradual series of reforms. 
Instigated by the ethno-linguistic cleavage between Flemings and Francophones, it is built 
on a complex architecture that has two types of subnational governments (or ‘federated 
entities’): three regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) and three Communities (Flemish, 
French and German-speaking). The regions have competences in ‘territorial’ matters such 
as environment, spatial planning, agriculture, industry, foreign trade, energy policy, trans-
port or infrastructure. The Communities have competences in ‘personal’ matters such as 
education, culture, health or sports (Swenden et al. 2006, p. 865–868). At the Flemish side, 
the regional and the Community competences are jointly managed by a single Flemish 
government. Figure 1 depicts the two types of subnational governments in Belgium, and 
where they overlap.
The focus in this article is on the regions, as the Communities do not hold many com-
petences that are relevant for climate change, and consequently do not conduct climate 
policies. The federal government, whose competences are mainly situated in the areas of 
justice and home affairs, defence, social security and taxation (Swenden & Jans 2006, p. 885), 
has only limited responsibilities for climate change. In Belgium, therefore, there is no doubt 
that the regions matter for climate governance, and that they control the main powers 
Figure 1. Belgian subnational governments.
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that are needed to conduct climate policies. For that reason, the Belgian regions are often 
regarded jealously by their European peers.
The Belgian system is built on principles of ‘dual’ federalism. That means that competences 
are divided in such a way that each level has a distinct set of responsibilities and can operate 
(semi-)autonomously from the other (Beyers & Bursens 2006a, p. 36–37). It distinguishes 
Belgium from systems of ‘cooperative’ federalism such as Germany. Three of the dual prin-
ciples, moreover, make the Belgian system overall rather unique. Firstly, competences in 
Belgium are divided on a strictly exclusive basis, meaning that all aspects (i.e. legislative and 
executive) of each competence can only pertain to one level of government. That principle 
was introduced to avoid as much as possible that Flemish and Francophone politicians would 
have to take decisions together (Swenden & Jans 2006, p. 886). Secondly, the exclusivity of 
competences extends to Belgium’s foreign policy. The in foro interno, in foro externo princi-
ple prescribes that the subnational governments can conduct an external policy for those 
policy issues that lie within their competences. That implies that they can include represent-
atives in national delegations for international negotiations and that they can ‘speak’ at the 
international level (Van den Brande et al. 2011, p. 73). For instance, for certain matters that 
relate to subnational competences, subnational ministers represent Belgium in the Council 
of Ministers of the EU (e.g. Industry, Environment, Fisheries). A concrete illustration of that 
is the fact that, during the Belgian EU Presidency in 2010, the Flemish Environment Minister 
presided the Environment Council and led the EU delegation at the Conference of the Parties 
of the UNFCCC in Cancún. The principle also implies that the federal government can only 
speak for Belgium when strictly federal competences are at stake. A third principle that dis-
tinguishes Belgium from most other federations, is the principle of no hierarchy between 
federal and subnational laws (Swenden 2006, p. 54). That implies that the federal government 
cannot impose anything on the subnational governments, and the latter cannot be bound 
by federal legislation, unlike in many other federal states. Everything that transcends one 
level of government – and that could thus be considered as ‘national’ – requires a consensus 
among the federal and all the subnational governments. Coordination on climate policy in 
Belgium is therefore always negotiated and never hierarchical. Negotiations to come to a 
consensus take place among equal partners.
However, while the system is built on those dual principles, multi-level governance 
in Belgium (not unlike other systems) in practice relies on a high degree of cooperation. 
That has two reasons. A first reason is that, although competences are divided on a strictly 
exclusive basis, the division happened in a very fragmented way within policy domains. 
Some examples elucidate that fragmentation. For environmental policy, the regions are 
largely competent, but the federal government retains minor responsibilities such as prod-
uct standardization. regarding energy, the regions have the competence over renewable 
energy policy and rational energy use, but the federal government controls nuclear energy 
and off-shore wind energy. As for transport policy, issues such as road transport, seaports, 
regional airports and public transport are subnational competences, but rail transport and 
the national airport are federal responsibilities (FOD VVVl 2008). If the successive constitu-
tional reforms had the intended result of neatly dividing all powers in order for both levels 
to operate in complete autonomy, they should thus be considered a failure, because there 
are no fully coherent competence packages in any domain. In addition, the federal govern-
ment retains the control over taxation, a policy instrument that is important for all policies 
(Swenden & Jans 2006, p. 885).
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The second reason why the Belgian system relies on cooperation, is because all decisions 
that transcend single competences (which is thus the case in many domains) require the 
approval of all involved governments. As a consequence, a plethora of cooperation mecha-
nisms was created, all functioning on the basis of unanimity. The most typical instruments 
are the so-called ‘cooperation agreements’ that are concluded between the federal and the 
subnational governments (or among subnational governments), on any topic considered 
relevant. They allow the governments to develop common policies or to jointly exercise their 
competences in a certain domain (Jans & Tombeur 2000, p. 148). Several hundreds of such 
cooperation agreements have been concluded. Among the other instruments of intergovern-
mental relations, the Deliberation Committee is the most formal one (reuchamps & Onclin 
2009, p. 33). It is composed of the Prime Minister, five federal ministers and six subnational 
ministers (with a perfect equilibrium of Flemish and Francophone representatives). When 
an issue is brought to the Deliberation Committee, the members have to find a solution 
within 60 days. It is the ‘compromise-building measure of last resort’ (Swenden & Jans 2006, 
p. 887), only used in the most pressing situations when all other mechanisms have failed to 
settle a dispute. That is also why it is rarely used. Much more important in day-to-day politics 
are the interministerial conferences. Since 1992, those conferences bring together federal 
and subnational ministers of a certain policy area (e.g. Environment, Agriculture, Health). 
Eighteen interministerial conferences are currently operational (FOD Kanselarij 2008). Each 
conference encloses a number of lower-level working groups for coordination on concrete 
policy issues, including on the international aspects of those issues (see Happaerts et al. 
2012; Van den Brande 2012).
What characterizes intergovernmental cooperation in Belgium, is the fact that no gov-
ernment can ever be forced to participate in intergovernmental negotiations, which is a 
consequence of the principle of no hierarchy. That means that persuasion and voluntary 
cooperation are the only leverage for intergovernmental relations (Jans & Tombeur 2000, 
p. 144). In line with the expectations of multi-level governance, however, cooperation is 
very often triggered by external requirements, such as European or global commitments 
(Beyers & Bursens 2006b, p. 1058). Those commitments are the number one argument to 
bring the different levels of government around the same table, and climate change is a 
good illustration of this. The reason is that many of the policy domains for which the subna-
tional governments have important competences are domains in which the EU has a large 
responsibility as well (e.g. environment or agriculture) (Beyers & Bursens 2006b, p. 1063). 
The ‘Europeanization’ of policy domains thus brings along a Europeanization of intergov-
ernmental cooperation in Belgium. In many cases, cooperation mechanisms are created in 
a first instance because the EU requires the output of a certain report or the adoption of a 
certain position. An intervening factor in the Europeanization of intergovernmental coop-
eration is that the EU has traditionally had a high normative authority in Belgium, meaning 
that politicians agree more easily on EU requirements than that they rely on intra-Belgian 
negotiations. This observation, however, increasingly needs to be nuanced since the out-
break of the European sovereign debt crisis.2
A final characteristic of the Belgian system that is relevant in the context of this article, 
is the politicized character of the multi-level interactions. Belgian federalism is executive 
(Swenden & Jans 2006, p. 886), which means that intergovernmental relations are controlled 
by elected officials of both levels of government – rather than by parliaments, as is the case in 
several other multi-level states (Skogstad 2000, p. 57). That is important, because Belgium is 
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a highly politicized country, where major decisions are taken by political rather than admin-
istrative officials, and where ministerial cabinets (composed of the personal advisors of each 
federal and subnational minister), are traditionally the main policy-making actors (Brans 
et al. 2005, p. 218). Furthermore, Belgium is often labelled a ‘particracy’ (Peters 2006, p. 1081), 
because policy and decision-making are monopolized by the political parties. Those are 
organized on a linguistic basis. In Belgian politics, therefore, there are no nation-wide parties, 
but only Flemish or Francophone parties, which each cater to their own electorate only. The 
formation of coalitions for subnational governments is therefore much more straightfor-
ward than for a federal government, which is always an amalgam of two party systems. The 
politicized character of the relations facilitated policy coherence and intergovernmental 
cooperation until 2004, when the federal government and all subnational governments were 
controlled by the same coalitions. Intergovernmental relations were then to a large degree 
‘intra-party’ relations (Swenden & Jans 2006, p. 887). When tensions did arise, the threat 
of political instability at one level of government was the common tool used by political 
parties to obtain a consensus at the other level. Yet after the subnational elections in 2004, 
coalitions were installed at the subnational level that for the first time did not mirror the 
ruling federal coalition. Since then, several political parties have been in power at one level 
of government, while being in opposition at the other level. Parties in that situation are 
less willing to ‘save’ the stability of a government of which they form no part. That political 
incongruence gravely complicates the resolution of intergovernmental conflicts or policy 
coherence among different governments (Swenden & Jans 2006, p. 887).
Maesschalck and Van De Walle (2006) argue that the Belgian institutional framework is 
conducive to policy failures, for instance when policy-making on one side of the language 
border happens without knowledge of what the other side is doing, or when federal and 
subnational policies contradict each other. The identification of that possibility counters the 
predominant tendency in the multi-level governance literature to stress the opportunities 
and potential advantages of multi-level dynamics, such as bottom-up policy innovation.
3. Sharing burdens and targets within Belgium
The design of climate policies in Belgium basically started with the intergovernmental nego-
tiations on the division of Belgium’s Kyoto targets. Before the climate policies of the Belgian 
subnational governments can be discussed, it must therefore be explained how the burdens 
of climate mitigation are shared within the country. The issue is a clear illustration of the 
Table 1. Intra-Belgian burden sharing (mt = megaton of co2-equivalents).
Kyoto target EU 20-20-20 targets
2008–2012 (base year: 1990) 2013–2020 (base year: 2005)
All sectors Non-ETS sectors
european union −8% −10%
Belgium −7.5% −15%
flanders −5.2% ?
Wallonia −7.5% ?
Brussels +3.475% ?
federal government −2.4 mt/year via flexible mechanisms ?
−4.8 mt/year via policy measures
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multi-level character of climate governance, and of the Europeanization of intergovernmen-
tal cooperation in Belgium.
Because of the exclusivity of competences, Belgium does not have a national climate 
policy. rather, the federal government and the three regions should each conduct their own 
climate policies within the realm of their respective competences. The necessity of dividing 
the Kyoto targets within Belgium was due to the fact that the regions are competent for 
industry, and were thus responsible for the allocation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
allowances to companies under the European Emissions Trading System (ETS).3 At the global 
level, the EU committed to an 8% reduction of GHG emissions compared to 1990 levels in 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, of which the first commitment period ran from 2008 to 2012. Within 
the EU, a burden sharing agreement was subsequently negotiated in 1998 and formalized 
in 2002 (Council of the EU 2002), assigning Belgium a reduction obligation of 7.5%. That 
national target thus needed to be divided among the Belgian governments.
The talks took a long time to get started, as after the conclusion of the EU burden sharing 
agreement the Belgian governments first invested much energy in setting up the right inter-
governmental cooperation mechanisms. The negotiations for an intra-Belgian burden shar-
ing agreement took place within ad hoc administrative and inter-cabinet working groups, 
and eventually within the Interministerial Conference on the Environment. The approach 
used in the talks has been characterized as a ‘best of both worlds’ scenario (Bollen et al. 2006, 
p. 165), meaning that each region would advance the target it wanted to commit to, and 
that the federal government would support reductions with policy measures related to its 
competences and by applying flexible mechanisms.4 However, the governments did not 
agree on a common position, inter alia because of the upcoming 2003 federal elections, and 
the matter was referred to the Deliberation Committee. Prime Minister Verhofstadt finally 
announced an agreement in March 2004 (FOD VVVl 2009). Flanders committed to a reduc-
tion of 5.2%, Wallonia pledged to reduce 7.5% and Brussels could increase its emissions by 
3.475%. The individual targets are shown in Table 1.
The targets are a reflection of the positions of the different governments. The Flemish 
government always insisted that on more reductions in those regions where that would be 
economically more efficient (Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap 2003, p. 177). While 
Flanders has an important energy-intensive industry, Wallonia already had fewer emissions 
by the end of the 2000s than in 1990, the base year of the Kyoto Protocol, because of the 
phase-out of the heavy coal industry (Van Hecke & Zgajewski 2008, p. 8). Wallonia, however, 
urged for identical targets for each region (Bollen et al. 2006, p. 165). Brussels, the small and 
de-industrialized capital region, refused to reduce emissions (Van Hecke & Zgajewski 2008, 
p. 26). As the sum of the three regions’ proposed targets did not result in the 7.5% Belgian 
target, the federal government committed to implement supporting measures that would 
reduce 4.8 Mt of CO2-equivalents per year, and to the purchase of carbon credits equivalent 
to 2.46 Mt/year through flexible mechanisms (Bollen et al. 2006, p. 166). That was a demand 
of the Flemish and the Francophone Greens, in power at the federal level at that time, and 
it represents a typically Belgian compromise, where the federal government literally ‘pays 
the bill’ when the regions’ commitments do not suffice.
With the end of Kyoto’s first commitment period approaching, negotiations have been 
started on a second intra-Belgian burden sharing agreement. That was the consequence 
of the EU’s climate and energy package, agreed in December 2008 (the so-called ’20-20-20’ 
targets).5 Under that agreement and the subsequent internal ‘effort sharing’ deal concluded 
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within the EU, Belgium needs to reduce its GHG emissions in the so-called non-ETS sectors 
by 15% by 2020 in relation to 2005 levels (see Table 1).6 But the negotiations were frozen 
after the June 2010 federal elections, which triggered an 18-month long political stalemate 
in Belgium until a new federal coalition was finally installed in December 2011. The principle 
of no hierarchy and the need to reach a consensus make that no intergovernmental relations 
can take place as long as one of the actors is absent. As the negotiations for the new burden 
sharing agreement concern non-ETS sectors (agriculture, transport, buildings and energy), 
the object of bargaining is now totally different in comparison to the first agreement. Two 
main issues are likely to dominate the talks. A first thorny issue is the role of the federal 
government in a post-2012 agreement. A second problem is that, in contrast to the previous 
burden sharing negotiations, the political landscape is now characterized by incongruent 
government coalitions. Party political preferences are therefore likely to oppose certain posi-
tions. In Flanders, for instance, the Environment portfolio is held by the Christian Democrats, 
who have not promoted ambitious climate goals so far. But in the Walloon government, the 
Green party has been urging for more ambitious targets.
The negotiations on an intra-Belgian burden sharing agreement reflect how intergovern-
mental relations and climate policy-making are both inherently Europeanized. But the dis-
cussion also uncovers a general lack of ambition to take proactive action on climate change. 
It appears that the efforts of the Belgian governments are purely triggered by international 
commitments, and that de facto nothing would happen without them.
Before turning to the analysis of the subnational climate policies, it is interesting to look 
ahead at the near future of climate governance in Belgium, in light of recent developments. 
The installation of the new federal coalition in December 2011 not only marked the end of 
the longest government formation in contemporary world history, but also a new period of 
Belgian climate governance: one in which the federal government’s role will be reduced to 
a strict minimum. That has two reasons. On the one hand, the coalition was formed in the 
context of a severe economic crisis and a European sovereign debt crisis, which pushed the 
coalition towards very stringent fiscal efforts to reduce its budget deficit. On the other hand, 
the coalition agreement was accompanied by an institutional agreement for a new Belgian 
state reform, which will shift a number of competences and responsibilities to the subna-
tional level. Those include some taxation instruments, such as tax breaks for energy-saving 
investments. Under the denominator of the state reform, but also pushed by the need for 
budget cuts, many of the measures that the federal government had previously undertaken 
for climate change were abruptly abolished by the coalition agreement, and after the state 
reform they will become impossible for the federal government to pursue. That shifts the 
core of Belgian climate governance even more to the regions. As a consequence of those 
dynamics, I not only envisage that the federal climate policy will be reduced to a minimum, 
but also that the federal government will commit to very little or no emission reductions in 
a post-2012 agreement. The traditional Belgian compromises that make the federal govern-
ment ‘pay the bill’ will be much harder to conclude.
4. The efforts of the regions: different policies, low ambitions
I first describe the policies of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels separately.7 Afterwards, some 
horizontal trends are uncovered.
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4.1. Flanders
In Flanders, climate policy has been the object of a specific planning process since 2002, when 
the first Flemish Climate Policy Plan was issued (Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap 
2003). The plan was above all meant to institutionalize climate policy in Flanders and to lay 
the first foundations for future policy measures, when the Flemish commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol would become clear. But the plan also advanced a first target for Flanders, i.e. 
to stabilize GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2005. While the plan was criticized to entail no 
further ambitions (De Mulder 2005), the stabilization target was not reached, partly because 
of the low involvement by sectoral ministers.
The second Flemish Climate Policy Plan that was issued in 2006, was more comprehensive 
than the first (Vlaamse Overheid 2006). Now clearly designed to reach the Flemish reduc-
tion target that was decided in 2004, the plan focused especially on measures in renewable 
energy, agriculture and forestry, on rational energy use in buildings, and on stimulating 
measures for the transport sector. It also stipulated that about 20% of the efforts should be 
reached through the use of flexible mechanisms.
When the end of Kyoto’s first commitment period was approaching, it was not entirely 
clear whether the Flemish reduction target of 5.2% would be reached. While emissions in 
the ETS sectors are clearly below the allowed level (due to the efforts of the industry but 
also as a consequence of the economic crisis), the non-ETS sectors display a reduction gap, 
because of the continuous increase of emissions from transport and buildings (Vlaamse 
Overheid 2011, p. 7).8 Precisely those non-ETS sectors form the object of the third Flemish 
Climate Policy Plan. Guided by the negotiations in the international climate regime, the new 
plan is divided into a mitigation and an adaptation plan. The mitigation plan needed another 
approach than the general one followed in the previous plan, as the EU now imposes a yearly 
reduction target, which is different than having only a single mid-term target. Because of 
those targets, reduction strategies for each of the non-ETS sectors are needed. A major 
problem is that Flanders and the other regions, anno 2013, are still uncertain about their spe-
cific reduction targets. That is due to the fact that the intergovernmental negotiations have 
still not reached an agreement on the intra-Belgian division of the EU’s effort sharing deal. 
One of the main critiques that stakeholders continuously utter with regard to the Flemish 
climate policy, is precisely its lack of a long-term vision (Minaraad 2009; SErV & Minaraad 
2009). Flanders finally decided to adopt a provisional target of 15% for 2020 (compared to 
2005 levels) (lNE 2012; Vlaamse Overheid 2013), but the uncertainty caused a serious delay 
of the policy formulation process.
Much like the previous plan, the use of flexible mechanisms is advanced as an indispen-
sable element of the Flemish climate policy. Differences with the previous period concern 
mostly the implementation and the financing. This time, the implementation accords a major 
role to the other sectoral ministers too. That is necessary to guide the reduction strategies 
of each of the non-ETS sectors. The new plan, however, proposes few new measures to 
mitigate reduction in those sectors, but relies mainly on existing policies and on intentions 
for new measures that have not been approved yet by the Flemish government. As for the 
financing of the new plan, the government conceived a new form of central funding, the 
Flemish Climate Fund, that is fed by the sales of emission rights to industrial installations and 
aviation companies. But the repartition of the proceeds of those sales, which is a national 
affair, is still subject to intergovernmental negotiations.
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4.2. Wallonia
The Walloon government issued its first Climate Change Action Plan in 2001, offering mainly 
an analysis of the current situation in the region (Ministère de la région wallonne 2001). In 
2007, the more comprehensive Air-Climate Plan was made (Ministère de la région wallonne 
2008), which was presented as one of the main environmental achievements of the coalition 
at that time. The Plan targeted a variety of domains, such as transport, energy, agriculture, 
forests, waste and spatial planning, but only a limited part of the actions it proposed was 
aimed at reducing GHG emissions, while the others concerned other issues of air quality. The 
government also committed to the use of flexible mechanisms, through participation in an 
international carbon fund, but only for a very limited amount. In any case, Wallonia will by 
far exceed the efforts it has to make under its Kyoto target, since in 2010 it already reduced 
its emissions by 21.4% (Wallonie 2012b), partly due to the economic crisis.
The 2009 subnational elections shook up the Walloon political landscape with a remark-
able victory for the Walloon Green party, who entered the government coalition with the 
Socialists and the Christian Democrats (Happaerts 2012). As the Greens’ election campaign 
focused on the ‘green economy’ as a solution to the economic crisis, the party used its strong 
bargaining position to introduce ambitious goals on climate change and sustainable devel-
opment in the coalition agreement. Consequently, that agreement states that Wallonia aims 
for a strategy to reduce GHG emissions by 30% in 2020 and by 80–95% in 2050 (Parlement 
wallon 2009, p. 60). The government commissioned a study that maps out possible scenarios 
to achieve the 2050 goals (Wallonie 2011). With the study – entitled ‘roadmap towards a 
low-carbon Wallonia’ – Wallonia refers to the EU’s roadmap for moving to a competitive low 
carbon economy in 2050 (European Commission 2011), and congratulates itself for being 
the first European subnational government to take such an initiative.
As promised by the coalition agreement (Parlement wallon 2009, p. 60), the Parliament 
adopted the first Walloon Climate law by the end of 2012 (Wallonie 2012a). In the absence 
of a final intra-Belgian burden-sharing agreement, the law codified the targets that the coa-
lition agreement committed to. Wallonia is now legally required to reduce its GHG emissions 
by 30% in 2020 and by 80–95% in 2050, compared to 1990 levels. The method to do so is 
inspired by the ‘carbon budgets’ of the UK’s 2008 Climate Change Act. Between 2013 and 
2050, five-yearly carbon allowances will be fixed and distributed between sectors (industry, 
agriculture, services, households, etc.). Each five-year period, a climate plan should adopt 
specific policy measures to achieve the reductions. While the law already determined the 
budgets for the periods 2013–2017 and 2018–2022, the policy plan – entitled Air-Climate-
Energy Plan – is not yet adopted.
The level of Wallonia’s ambitions can only be assessed against the specific policy meas-
ures that are imposed on each sector. The legal basis for Wallonia’s reduction targets, which 
perfectly reflect the EU’s objectives (see footnote 5), is certainly commendable. However, 
observers point out that the 2020 target is hardly ambitious, because Wallonia was already 
set to achieve a 24% reduction in a business-as-usual scenario (IEW 2013). The novelty there-
fore lies in the adoption of a long-term target and the specific policy strategies that are still 
to be defined.
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4.3. Brussels
Brussels’s first and still only climate policy plan was issued in 2002, immediately after the 
Johannesburg Summit. As in the case of Wallonia, the plan jointly addresses climate change 
and air quality (Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest 2002). Yet that combination makes much 
sense in Brussels, since most of its atmospheric pollutants are also the main sources of GHG 
emissions (Van Hecke & Zgajewski 2008, p. 27). Most sectoral measures are situated in the 
areas of transport and rational energy use. 30% of the effort should happen through the 
use of flexible mechanisms (via an international carbon fund) (Van Hecke & Zgajewski 2008, 
p. 28). The government frequently emphasizes the special situation of the region as Belgium’s 
capital, where the industry is already in decline and where much of the pollution is actually 
‘imported’ from Flanders and Wallonia, or linked to commuters who work in Brussels but live 
outside of it. Those concerns partly explain why the plan is very little ambitious.
In transnational forums, however, Brussels does display significant climate ambitions. 
For instance, the region adhered to the Covenant of Mayors, a European initiative through 
which local governments pledge to achieve and exceed the EU’s climate and energy goals 
for 2020 (Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest 2009b; Covenant of Mayors 2012).
Also Brussels is in the process of formulating a new plan (see Brussels Hoofdstedelijk 
Gewest 2009a). That is long overdue, since the Air-Climate Plan only covered the period 
between 2002 and 2010. The priority themes have already been fixed, and largely correspond 
with the non-ETS-sectors.9 While no specific goals have yet been made public, Brussels esti-
mates to achieve an emission reduction of 10–15% by 2020. That ambition is starkly below 
Brussels’s pledges in the context of the Covenant of Mayors (which suggests that the large 
membership of such networks not always implies an equal number of ambitious actors).
4.4. Horizontal findings
After the analysis of the three regions’ climate policies, three observations are brought to 
the attention. They refer to the large policy-making autonomy, the lack of ambitious goals 
and the deficiency of a long-term vision.
Policy planning for climate change started around 2001 and 2002 in the three regions. 
Several factors contributed to that, such as the presence of the Green party in all government 
coalitions at that time, and the fact that Belgium held the EU Presidency in 2001, when the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the preparation of the Johannesburg Summit figured 
high on the political agenda. But despite the common timing, differences are observed with 
respect to the framing of the issue (together with air quality or not) and to the instruments 
that are applied (e.g. the use of flexible mechanisms). The possibility of such widely diverging 
subnational policies is a consequence of the absolute policy-making autonomy that Belgian 
federalism grants to the subnational governments. It does not, however, make coordination 
any easier and it does not facilitate policy coherence. For instance, it has been found that 
the multiplicity of different policies and procedures with regard to flexible mechanisms that 
apply in Belgium is very unattractive to investors (Conix 2009, p. 70).
A second observation is the overall lack of ambitious goals. Even in Wallonia, where reduc-
tion targets are now legally fixed, those have not been crystallized into specific mitigation 
policies yet. Even if the Kyoto targets are reached, aided by the economic crisis and the use 
of flexible mechanisms, those targets can hardly be labeled as very ambitious. The lack of 
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ambition reveals a low political will for climate change among the Belgian political elite to 
reduce emissions domestically. But in addition to a low political will, this article argues that 
Belgian federalism is also to blame. Indeed, the system allows – or sometimes even encour-
ages – governments to shift their responsibilities upon each other. A central adage in the 
Flemish policy discourse since 2004 is that Flanders should not bear unreasonable burdens 
with regard to emission reductions (De Mulder 2005; Vlaamse Overheid 2006, p. 34), point-
ing towards the energy-intensive Flemish industry and the possibility of other regions to 
reduce emissions more efficiently. Moreover, the first Flemish climate policy plan indicated 
that the stabilization goal could only be reached when certain policies were enacted at 
the federal level (Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap 2003, p. 11). The Walloon plans 
very frequently point towards measures that should actually be taken at the federal level. 
In Brussels, the climate policy is very careful not to hinder the capital’s remaining industry, 
and it is quick to stress that many of its environmental problems are actually due to inhab-
itants of Flanders and Wallonia who commute to Brussels. The federal level engages in such 
‘externalization’ of responsibilities too, as it is completely breaking off its climate measures 
under the denominator of the next state reform. The Belgian system, where all competences 
are exclusively yet very incoherently divided among levels of government, facilitates the 
governments’ tendencies to point towards each other to take action on such a complex 
domain as climate change where their own political ambitions are low.
The manifest lack of a long-term vision on climate policy in Belgium is an obvious third 
observation. Due to the prolonged political crisis that followed the 2010 federal elections, 
all intergovernmental negotiations that require political bargaining were frozen. Without 
those negotiations, it was impossible to come to an agreement on how international com-
mitments that encompass the two levels of government will be arranged, in this case the 
Belgian reduction targets under the EU effort sharing deal. In the case of climate change, 
where external obligations are the number one leverage for the Belgian entities to act, in 
absence of a proactive political engagement, the lack of clarity with regard to those targets 
had seriously delayed the regions’ ability to prepare their new plans, and to take political 
decisions for them. recent developments in Flanders and Wallonia occasioned a remarkable 
precedent when, in continuous absence of a burden-sharing agreement, the two biggest 
regions adopted ‘unilateral’ targets (with a legal basis in the case of Wallonia), thereby limit-
ing the scope of a future burden sharing agreement to a strict minimum. While it is unclear 
how those moves influence climate policy-making in Belgium in the future, it is clear that 
the long stalemate and political difficulties at the federal level seriously hindered the crys-
tallization of a long-term vision on climate policy at all levels of government.
A low policy coherence (because of the large policy-making autonomy, the lack of ambi-
tion and the inability to come to a long-term vision can be characterized as policy failures, 
as described by Maesschalck and Van De Walle (2006). Previous research demonstrated that 
the Belgian federal architecture is conducive to policy failures in the field of climate change 
at the national and international level as well (Happaerts et al. 2012). Examples include the 
fact that Belgium was brought before the European Court of Justice in 2005, for not trans-
posing in time the EU Emissions Trading Directive, or the inability to adopt a Belgian position 
in UNFCCC negotiations, because of internal battles and ideological divides between the 
different governments. While many of those policy failures are to a large part attributable 
to a low political will on the part of political elites to take strong action on climate change, 
each of the problems is strengthened by the dynamics inherent to the Belgian system. This 
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underscores that Belgium is a crucial case in contradicting much of the literature’s tendency 
to emphasize the innovative potential of decentralized systems to support the design and 
implementation of ambitious subnational climate policies.
5. Conclusion
We studied the impact of the main characteristics of Belgian federalism – the exclusive 
division of competences, the principle of no hierarchy and the Europeanization of inter-gov-
ernmental relations, as well as the various institutional mechanisms that have been set up 
as a consequence of these – on the climate policies of the subnational governments. In the 
analysis, the overall low political ambition for climate policy emerged as an intervening varia-
ble. It was found that hat the Belgian subnational governments cannot be considered as loci 
of bottom-up policy innovation. This is mainly due to a lack of political will for far-reaching 
measures to reduce GHG emissions, but it is strengthened by the characteristics of Belgian 
federalism, especially the principle of no hierarchy and the exclusive division of competences.
In Belgium’s multi-level system, climate governance in general is not well advanced. Even 
the policy initiatives that have been taken, are not aimed at fundamental changes that are 
needed to achieve the transition towards a low-carbon society, which is illustrated by the 
frequent recurrence to flexible mechanisms at the expense of domestic reduction meas-
ures. Although they have multiple assets to conduct ambitious and innovative policies, 
the Belgian subnational governments are no laboratories of experimentation for climate 
change. In particular two dynamics of the very complex multi-level architecture prevent 
policy innovation for climate change.
First, although it is not considered a political priority, climate change is a very sensitive 
political issue, also in Belgium. The reason is that it touches upon core issues such as the 
organization of the regional economy, the future of the industry, transport, energy, etc. In 
such domains very often ideological confrontations arise, for instance between centre-right 
and centre-left parties, and those can turn into intergovernmental conflicts when govern-
ments are ruled by asymmetrical coalitions. Negotiations on climate measures are then easily 
blocked before elections and during periods of coalition formation. The political sensitivity 
of climate change in Belgium is illustrated by the fact that the Deliberation Committee had 
to intervene to strike a deal in 2004, and by the fact that Europeanization pressures are 
not strong enough to push the governments towards an agreement. In short, ideological 
differences in a politically sensitive issue appear to hijack the usual mechanisms of coordi-
nation and cooperation of the Belgian system, that are crucial for policy-making in complex 
domains.
Second, the analysis confirmed the multi-level character of climate governance. But in 
that multi-level structure, this article only identified top-down dynamics. Action in Belgium is 
exclusively triggered by EU requirements, which follow from the global negotiations. Within 
Belgium, the subnational governments adopt a wait-and-see attitude. They take up a very 
defensive position vis-à-vis the commitments that come from higher levels of governance. 
In the Belgian case, indeed, we see very little examples of bottom-up policy innovation for 
climate change. It demonstrates that subnational policy-making autonomy in a multi-level 
setting not only offers opportunities for environmental governance, but that it can also have 
a limiting effect. The Belgian context gives each government a set of reasons that motivate 
why more efforts should actually be done by the other partners, and it entails no leverages 
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to force the subnational governments into a more ambitious role. In such a setting, when 
there is little political will to take action on an issue, the potential opportunities for experi-
mentation are not put into effect. Belgian climate governance is thus characterized by inertia, 
both domestically as well as on the international stage.
On the basis of those findings, it is concluded that status quo policies are favoured when 
politically sensitive issues generate ideological face-offs in a multi-level setting. It needs to 
be emphasized that not all problems can be explained by the specific Belgian multi-level 
architecture alone. The core problem, of course, is the lack of political will of the Belgian 
political elite to take an ambitious stance in climate governance. But the analysis in this article 
demonstrates how the complex multi-level architecture actually allows them to maintain 
those low ambitions, and how it can even strengthen that tendency. Nevertheless, recent 
developments in Wallonia indicate that the limiting effects and inertia of the Belgian system 
can be breached when a willing political actor comes forward. The formulation of the new 
Walloon climate plan will point out whether those dynamics can counter the conclusions 
outlined here, and come forward with ambitious policy measures. As for now, no ambitious 
climate policies have been adopted in Belgium for the post-2012 period.
The analysis of subnational climate policies in Belgium should be regarded as a critical case 
in multi-level climate governance, both in Western democracies as well as in newly industri-
alizing countries. It shows how a multi-level system, besides offering multiple opportunities 
to subnational governments, can also have a inhibiting effect and be conducive to policy 
failures. It indicates a need to avoid blind optimism with respect to multi-level solutions, 
and urges both scholars and policy-makers to consider other and additional ways to deal 
with climate change in a complex political landscape.
Notes
1.  The article builds on earlier research documented by (Happaerts et al. 2012), who focused 
especially on intergovernmental relations for climate change. An earlier version of this 
manuscript was presented at the Thematic Workshop of the Indian–European Multilevel Climate 
Governance research Network, 20–22 November 2013, at Kolkata.
2.  The current European sovereign debt crisis has triggered a debate among Belgian political 
parties on how stringent EU recommendations actually are, for instance in the context of the 
European semester. Moreover, it stimulated a new wave of ‘euroskepticism’ within the EU, also 
in Belgium.
3.  The ETS is the EU’s system of emissions trading that allocated allowances for GHG emissions 
to industrial installations in the member states, based on a ‘cap and trade’ principle (European 
Commission 2010).
4.  The Kyoto Protocol had at its heart three ‘flexible mechanisms’: emissions trading (e.g. the 
EU ETS), Joint Implementation (JI), which allowed industrialized, so-called Annex I countries 
to offset emissions in other Annex I countries in exchange for carbon credits, and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), which foresaw the possibility of Annex I countries to invest 
in low-carbon projects in non-Annex I countries in exchange for credits counting toward the 
fulfillment of their Kyoto target.
5.  By 2020, the EU aims to reduce GHG emissions by 20% (by 30% if a global agreement including 
comparable targets for other industrialized countries is reached), to reduce energy consumption 
by 20% and to achieve 20% of renewable energy (European Council 2007).
6.  As from the period 2013–2020, the emissions in the sectors falling under the ETS will be 
assigned at the European level and do not require national allocation anymore. Their reduction 
target for 2012 is 21% compared to 2005 levels. The emissions not covered by the ETS – in 
essence those stemming from agriculture, transport, buildings and energy – were subject to 
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a new internal deal on ‘effort sharing’ to divide the 10% target compared to 2005 levels. The 
two targets combined should achieve an overall 20% reduction of GHG emission in the EU in 
relation to 1990 levels.
7.  The focus is on the policy plans and strategies that aim specifically at reducing GHG emissions. 
In addition to the policies discussed here, the Belgian regions also conduct (renewable) energy 
policies that are relevant in the context of climate change mitigation.
8.  A final assessment can only be made early 2014, when the emission data of 2012 will be known. 
At the time of writing, the Flemish government estimates that, after the implementation of 
the domestic measures, a reduction gap of about 19 Mt will remain (Vlaamse Overheid 2011). 
In order to reach the Kyoto target, that gap will thus have to be filled through the purchase of 
credits, which will significantly increase the total share of flexible mechanisms in the Flemish 
climate policy.
9.  The nine priority themes are building; urban and spatial planning; transport; the government’s 
exemplary role; waste; economy and employment; taxation; financing; and energy supply and 
production (Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest 2009a).
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